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THE DECLINING FORTUNES OF AMERICAN WORKERS: SIX
DIMENSIONS AND AN AGENDA FOR REFORM
Stephen F. Befort*
Abstract
At the turn of the century, I undertook an assessment of the thencurrent state of workplace rights and obligations. I concluded that the
balance of power between employers and workers was “badly skewed”
in favor of employers. This Article revisits that topic for the purpose of
assessing twenty-first-century trends through the lens of six workplace
dimensions. They are: workforce attachment, union–management
relations, employment security, income inequality, balancing work and
family, and retirement security. An examination of these dimensions
reveals that the status of U.S. workers has significantly declined during
the first sixteen years of the twenty-first century. This Article then sets
out a proposed agenda for reform designed to recalibrate the current
imbalance in the respective fortunes of employees and employers.
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INTRODUCTION
The American workplace is subject to less regulation than the rest of
the industrialized world.1 U.S. employers are free to hire and fire
employees at will.2 U.S. law does not mandate paid parental leave or a
minimum period of paid vacation leave.3 The vast majority of the U.S.
economy is union-free.4
At the turn of the century, I undertook an assessment of the thencurrent state of workplace rights and obligations. I concluded that the
balance of power between employers and workers was “badly skewed”
in favor of employers.5 This Article revisits that topic to assess twentyfirst century trends. The clear and unvarnished conclusion is that the
disequilibrium has only worsened and meaningful reform is necessary to
enhance fundamental workplace fairness.

1. STEPHEN F. BEFORT & JOHN W. BUDD, INVISIBLE HANDS, INVISIBLE OBJECTIVES:
BRINGING WORKPLACE LAW & PUBLIC POLICY INTO FOCUS 48 (Stanford Univ. Press, 2009).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See id. at 108.
5. Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review
and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 422 (2002).
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Part I of this Article examines six dimensions that have contributed to
the declining fortunes of American workers. These dimensions are:
1. Workforce attachment;
2. Union–management relations;
3. Employment security;
4. Income inequality;
5. Balancing work and family; and
6. Retirement security.
Each of these dimensions reveals that the rights of U.S. workers have
significantly diminished during the first sixteen years of the twenty-first
century.
Part II sets out a needed agenda for reform focused on the six
dimensions listed above. While the current fractious political
environment is not likely to support broad-based reform, significant legal
and policy changes are sorely needed to enhance workplace equity and
voice.
I. ASSESSING WORKPLACE FAIRNESS THROUGH SIX DIMENSIONS
This Article examines six work-related dimensions in an attempt to
gauge the changing fortunes of American workers. Unfortunately, the
trend is not bearing in a favorable direction.
A. Workforce Attachment
The predominant employment model in the United States for much of
the twentieth century was that of a “core worker system” characterized
by long-term employment relationships.6 Employers during this period
generally found it advantageous to promote long-term tenure by
providing competitive wage rates, training and development plans, and
internal lines of progression and promotion.7
6. RICHARD S. BELOUS, THE CONTINGENT ECONOMY: THE GROWTH OF THE TEMPORARY,
PART-TIME AND SUBCONTRACTED WORKFORCE 12 (1989). As explained by Belous:
Core workers have a strong affiliation with an employer and are treated by the
employer as having a significant stake in the company. Core workers can be
thought of as being part of the so-called corporate family. They show long-term
attachment to a company and have a real measure of job stability.
Id. at 5.
7. SANFORD M. JACOBY, EMPLOYING BUREAUCRACY: MANAGERS, UNIONS, AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF WORK IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY, 1900–1945, at 254–69 (1985); Matthew W.
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But the core worker system has significantly diminished, displaced by
a growing “contingent workforce” who provide work other than on a
long-term, full-time basis.8 Some contingent workers, such as
independent contractors and leased workers are not “employees” of the
entity for whom they provide services.9 Others, such as part-time and
temporary employees, have the legal status of employees, but with a
lesser degree of attachment to the workplace than that exhibited by
traditional “core” employees.10 Although it is difficult to determine the
exact number of contingent workers due to varying definitions, the U.S.
General Accountability Office estimated in 2015 that contingent workers
account for approximately 40% of all American workers, up from 30% a
decade earlier.11
Two additional categories of workers also exhibit attributes of
precarious work relationships. Workers who perform work in the gig or
sharing economy constitute one of those categories.12 Uber drivers and
Amazon Mechanical Turk taskers are examples of this “crowdwork.”13
What makes crowdwork unique is the division in identity between the
entity that directs the work (i.e., Uber) and the recipient beneficiaries of
that work (i.e., Uber passengers).14 This unique structure helps explain
the widespread and controversial litigation contesting whether
crowdworkers should have the status of employees or independent
contractors.15 In a recent article, Professor Miriam Cherry describes the
Finkin, The Bureaucratization of Work: Employer Policies and Contract Law, 1986 WIS. L. REV.
733, 751–52.
8. See Befort, supra note 5, at 366–67; BELOUS, supra note 6, at 5–6; see also Jennifer
Middleton, Contingent Workers in a Changing Economy: Endure, Adapt, or Organize?, 22
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 557, 564 (1996) (noting a greater than 30% increase in contingent
workers between 1980 and 1996).
9. Stephen F. Befort, Revisiting the Black Hole of Workplace Regulation: A Historical and
Comparative Perspective of Contingent Work, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153, 158 (2003).
10. Id.
11. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CONTINGENT WORKFORCE: SIZE,
CHARACTERISTICS, EARNINGS, AND BENEFITS 4 (2015), www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-168R.
12. Natasha Singer, In the Sharing Economy, Workers Find Both Freedom and Uncertainty,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/17/technology/in-the-sharingeconomy-workers-find-both-freedom-and-uncertainty.html?_r=0.
13. See generally Alek Felstiner, Working the Crowd: Employment and Labor Law in the
Crowdsourcing Industry, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 143 (2011) (assessing crowdsourcing
through a case-study of Amazon’s Mechanical Turk); Henry Ross, Ridesharing’s House of Cards:
O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc. and the Viability of Uber’s Labor Model in Washington, 90
WASH. L. REV. 1431 (2015) (discussing Uber’s employment model).
14. See Felstiner, supra note 13, at 145–46.
15. See generally Miriam A. Cherry, Beyond Misclassification: The Digital Transformation
of Work, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 577 (2016) (summarizing the status of various worker
lawsuits within the on-demand economy).
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work performed by fourteen million American crowdworkers as a
modern type of piecework characterized by deskilled tasks and low pay.16
In his book, The Fissured Workplace, Professor David Weil describes
yet another group of workers—those spun off by lead companies through
such strategies as subcontracting and franchising.17 These workers are not
usually categorized as contingent workers since they are employees of
the spun-off entities.18 However, Weil describes how fissuring depresses
wages and regulatory compliance.19 The leaner lead companies, Weil
concludes, attempt to have it both ways: imposing work standards on
spun-off firms while avoiding the legal obligations that flow from direct
employment.20
Contingent work arrangements are attractive to employers as a means
to maximize labor market flexibility. Advances in technology and
transportation have spawned a global marketplace and incentivized firms
to enhance competitiveness through flexible work arrangements.21
Contingent workers add to the flexibility of the workforce by enabling
companies to adjust personnel and staffing needs while avoiding “the
expense of cyclical hiring and lay-off periods.”22 Firms expand their
workforce by hiring contingent workers in boom times, and then let the
contingent workers go when cycles turn downward.23
While employers reap many benefits from this greater labor market
flexibility, the increase in contingent work comes with several costs for
employees and unions. As I explained in my turn-of-the-century article:
“Contingent workers tend to earn less pay . . . [and] are less likely to enjoy
employer-paid health care coverage and other employee benefits.
Contingent workers generally receive less training and are often more
unemployed. They also feel less loyalty and commitment to their
employers.”24

16. Id. at 577–78, 600–02.
17. See generally DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD
FOR SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT (2014).
18. Id. at 272–74.
19. Id. at 15–18.
20. Id. at 183.
21. See Befort, supra note 9, at 160.
22. Id.; Maria O’Brien Hylton, The Case Against Regulating the Market for Contingent
Employment, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 849, 858 (1995).
23. SAMUEL ESTREICHER & STEWART J. SCHWAB, FOUNDATIONS OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW 25 (2000).
24. Befort, supra note 5, at 416; Clyde W. Summers, Contingent Employment in the United
States, 18 COMP. LAB. L.J. 503, 520 (1997).
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In addition, many contingent workers have not voluntarily chosen
their work status.25 Some studies have indicated that as many as 60% of
temporary employees and 20% of part-time employees would prefer
more traditional full-time jobs.26
Perhaps the most significant problem that the rise in nonstandard
employment arrangements poses, however, is the fact that many of these
workers fall outside of the regulatory safety net constructed for the
employment relationship. This occurs because American labor and
employment regulations extend only to “employee[s].”27
Courts generally use either of two tests to determine employee status.
The most frequently used standard is the common law agency test.28 This
test primarily focuses on the employer’s “right to control not only the
result accomplished by the work, but also the details and means by which
that result is accomplished.”29
A somewhat more inclusive “economic realities”30 test is used to
determine employee status under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
(FLSA)31 and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).32 A
Department of Labor opinion letter summarized this approach, stating
that “an employee, as distinguished from a person who is engaged as a
business of his own, is one who, as a matter of economic reality follows
the usual path of an employee and is dependent on the business for which
he serves.”33

25. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: COMMISSION ON THE
FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 35 (1994).
26. POLLY CALLAGHAN & HEIDI HARTMANN, ECON. POLICY INST., CONTINGENT WORK: A
PART-TIME
AND
TEMPORARY
EMPLOYMENT 19
(1991),
CHART BOOK ON
http://www.epi.org/files/2014/contingent-work.pdf.
27. See Befort, supra note 5, at 417; Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, The Labor Market
Transformed: Adapting Labor and Employment Law to the Rise of the Contingent Work Force,
52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 879, 883 (1995) (“Under our social welfare system, the receipt of
statutory protection or benefits is dependent on a person meeting the definition of ‘employee’
under the relevant statute.”).
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
29. Lewis L. Maltby & David C. Yamada, Beyond “Economic Realities”: The Case for
Amending Federal Employment Discrimination Laws to Include Independent Contractors, 38
B.C. L. REV. 239, 248 (1997) (internal quotations omitted); Befort, supra note 5, at 417.
30. Id.
31. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).
32. See Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 727, 730, 731 (1947); Graziadio
v. Culinary Inst. of Am., 817 F.3d 415, 422 (2d Cir. 2016); 29 C.F.R. § 825.105 (2016).
33. U.S. DEP’T LABOR WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, FACT SHEET #13: EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIP UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA) 1 (2007),
https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs13.pdf.
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The U.S. Supreme Court reinvigorated the common law standard in
its 1992 decision in Nationwide Mutual Ins. v. Darden.34 In that case, the
Court rejected the use of an economic realities test in determining
employee status for The Employment Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA) purposes, suggesting that the broader standard was limited
in application to the FLSA.35 The Court instead adopted a thirteen-factor
formulation of the common law test.36
As I summarized in my 2002 article:
The [restrictive] Darden test is problematic for several
reasons. For one thing, the test can produce unpredictable
results. Any formula with thirteen variables is bound to
have considerable play in the joints. . . .
The Darden test is also prone to entrepreneurial
manipulation. As the final report of President Clinton’s
blue-ribbon Dunlop Commission noted, the [common
law] test provides employers with both “a means and
incentive to circumvent the employment policies of the
nation.” . . . [Many employers] structure work
arrangements so that subcontractors and leased employees
fall on the non-employee side of the Darden divide.
Finally, the [restrictive] common law test is
inconsistent with the fundamental objectives of modern
labor and employment legislation. . . . By focusing
primarily on the right to control, the test denies the
benefits of protective social legislation to many workers
who labor under subordinate economic circumstances. As
Professor Marc Linder puts it, the common law test is
rooted in a “denial of socioeconomic purpose.”37
Contingent work arrangements also contribute to union decline.
Contingent workers, with their weak affiliation with the enterprise, are a
difficult group to organize.38

34. 503 U.S. 318 (1992).
35. Id. at 325–26.
36. Id. at 323–24.
37. Befort, supra note 5, at 419–20 (footnotes omitted) (first quoting U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
supra note 25, at 38; and then quoting Marc Linder, Dependent and Independent Contractors in
Recent U.S. Labor Law: An Ambiguous Dichotomy Rooted in Simulated Statutory
Purposelessness, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y 187, 187 (1999)).
38. See Befort, supra note 5, at 370–71; Katherine M. Forster, Strategic Reform of
Contingent Work, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 551 (2001).
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Thus, in comparison to the turn of the century, the number of
American workers engaged in contingent work relationships continues to
grow.39 As more workers fall outside the regulatory safety net, they
increasingly perform routinized tasks, earn less income, and face the
prospect of precarious job tenure.
B. Union–Management Relations
Unions are the most significant voice mechanism for American
workers.40 But that voice has lost volume with declining union
membership.
1. The NLRA and Union Density
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) is the principal federal
statute regulating labor/management relations in the private sector.41
Although the NLRA does not apply in the public sector,42 most states
have enacted labor relations acts applicable to public employers and
employees.43 Many of these statutes provide rights and obligations
similar to the NLRA, with the notable exception that a majority of the
state statutes do not protect the right to strike.44
The NLRA protects three types of employee conduct. First, the NLRA
protects the right of employees to engage or not engage in organizational
activities.45 A second right conferred by the NLRA is the right of
employees to bargain collectively through their selected union
representative, with both employers and unions obligated to negotiate in
“good faith.”46 Finally, the NLRA protects the right of employees to
engage in “concerted activities for . . . mutual aid or protection.”47
Collective rights arising under the NLRA are enforced through
administrative procedures under the auspices of the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB).48 Enforceable rights also are created by
collective bargaining agreements negotiated pursuant to the NLRA.
“[T]he vast majority of such agreements provide for a ‘just cause’

39. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
40. BEFORT & BUDD, supra note 1, at 107–08.
41. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012).
42. Id. § 152(2).
43. See MARTIN H. MALIN ET AL., PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS
292–94 (2d ed. 2011).
44. See id. 292–94, 557.
45. 29 U.S.C. § 157; see Befort, supra note 5, at 357–59.
46. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
47. Id. § 157.
48. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a), (d); id. § 160(c).
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limitation on employee discipline and discharge,” enforceable through a
“grievance procedure culminating in binding arbitration.”49
The decline of the American union movement is a long-running story.
Union membership in the United States peaked in 1954 at 34.7% of the
nonagricultural labor force and then began a long and steady decline.50
Union density dropped to 27.3% in 1970 and continued downward to
16.1% in 1990.51 By the turn of the century, union density stood at
13.5%.52 The decline has slowed, but not stopped, as the most recently
available data for 2016 show union membership at 10.7% of the
nonagricultural labor force. 53 Looking only at the private sector, union
members comprise just 6.4% of the current private-sector labor force.54
2. Employer Opposition and Deficiencies in the NLRA’s
Regulatory Structure
A number of factors, such as globalization55 and the drive for flexible
employment practices,56 have contributed to union decline. These factors,
however, do not explain why the decline in union density has been more
severe in the United States than in many other western industrialized
countries.57
Two other factors may explain the steepness of the U.S. decline. First,
a unique attribute of the American system of labor relations is the active
opposition of U.S. employers to union organization efforts. Second,
weaknesses in the NLRA regulatory scheme treat many anti-union tactics
as lawful and fail to deter adequately others that are not.58
Four examples illustrate the remedial shortcomings of the NLRA.
First, the NLRA remedies illegal employer actions, such as the discharge
of leading employee organizers with only a cease and desist order

49. See Befort, supra note 5, at 359.
50. MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 10
tbl.1 (1987).
51. Charles B. Craver, The Relevance of the NLRA and Labor Organizations in the PostIndustrial, Global Economy, 57 LAB. L.J. 133, 133–34 (2006); Befort, supra note 5, at 361.
52. See Befort, supra note 5, at 361.
53. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Members
Summary (Jan. 26, 2017), http://stats.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm.
54. See id. (reporting that 7.1 million public sector employees belonged to a union as
compared to 7.4 million private sector employees). As of 2016, 34.4% of all government workers
were union members, accounting for nearly half of total union membership. Id.
55. See Befort, supra note 5, at 362–64.
56. Id. at 366–71.
57. See WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIPS AND THE LAW 14–15 tbl.2.1 (1994).
58. Befort, supra note 5, at 372–75.

198

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

coupled with reinstatement and back pay.59 The NLRA does not provide
for fines, punitive damages, or any other “penalty.”60
The NLRA’s relatively weak remedial scheme also lessens the
effectiveness of the act’s bargaining mandate. The only remedy
recognized under the NLRA for a party’s refusal to engage in good faith
bargaining is an order requiring that party to return to the bargaining
table.61
Third, an additional shortcoming of the NLRA scheme flows from an
employer’s ability to hire permanent replacements to fill the positions of
striking employees. An employer lawfully may decline to reinstate a
striker at the conclusion of a strike so long as the position continues to be
occupied by a replacement employee.62
Finally, employers have increasingly discovered the offensive lockout
as a powerful coercive weapon.63 Until 1965, the NLRA permitted
employers to engage in a lockout only as a defensive shield against
certain union activities, but in that year the Supreme Court held that an
employer could initiate an offensive lockout in support of bargaining
demands.64 The NLRB subsequently expanded the parameters of the
permissible offensive lockout by ruling that employers need not wait until
impasse to institute a lockout65 and could hire temporary employees to
continue operations during a lockout.66 The offensive lockout has proved
such a successful and devastating weapon that, by 2011, a majority of
major work stoppages were the result of lockouts rather than strikes.67

59. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2012).
60. See Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization
Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1776, 1789 (1983); Befort, supra note 5, at 373.
61. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107, 110 (1970), rev’d, 449 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
enforced, 449 F.2d 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see Befort, supra note 5, at 373–74. The Supreme
Court has ruled that the NLRB is without power to impose substantive contract terms in the event
of a violation, even where the NLRB has concluded that an employer has acted in a manner
designed to frustrate the bargaining process. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 102 (1970).
62. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 348 (1938); Laidlaw Corp., 171
N.L.R.B. 1366, 1369–70 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
920 (1970); Befort, supra note 5, at 374–75.
63. See generally Douglas E. Ray & Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, Revisiting the
Offensive Bargaining Lockout on the Fiftieth Anniversary of American Ship Building Company
v. NLRB, 31 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 325 (2016) (describing the increased usage and impact of
the offensive lockout over the past five decades).
64. Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965).
65. Harter Equip., Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. 597, 600 (1986).
66. Darling & Co., 171 N.L.R.B. 801, 803 (1968).
67. See Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 280 Major Work Stoppages in 2011 (Feb.
8, 2012), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/wkstp_02082012.htm. The Bureau of Labor
Statistics defines “major work stoppages” as those involving 1,000 or more workers. Id.
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In short, U.S. labor law is not kind to employees who want union
representation. Given management’s natural economic leverage in the
workplace, the significance of employer-opposition activities is not lost
on the employee electorate.68
This dimension, accordingly, also shows a decline in worker fortunes.
Union density rates have dropped from 13.5% in 2000 to 10.7% in
2016.69 In 2011 alone, twelve states adopted legislation curtailing publicsector bargaining rights in one fashion or another.70 And, employers
increasingly are successful in using lockouts and replacement workers to
enhance their bargaining leverage. Employee voice in the form of union
representation has lost volume since the turn of the century.
C. Employment Security
In the absence of a statute or contract to the contrary, the default status
of employment relationships in the United States is governed by the atwill rule.71 According to the classic formulation of the rule, “All may
dismiss their employees at will, be they many or few, for good cause, for
no cause or even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty
of legal wrong.”72
The American at-will rule flouts prevailing international norms.
Virtually all other industrialized nations have adopted legislation that
requires some variant of a just-cause standard for an employee’s
dismissal.73 These statutes are consistent with the International Labor
Organization’s Convention No. 158, which states that
the employment of a worker shall not be terminated unless
there is a valid reason for such termination connected with
the capacity or conduct of the worker or based on the
operational requirements of the undertaking, establishment
or service.74
The latter half of the twentieth century witnessed the emergence of
68. BEFORT & BUDD, supra note 1, at 111.
69. See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.
70. See generally Martin H. Malin, The Legislative Upheaval in Public-Sector Labor Law:
A Search for Common Elements, 27 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 149 (2012) (discussing changes to
public employee collective bargaining in twelve states).
71. See Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right of
Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 68–70 (2000). See generally Jay M. Feinman, The
Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976) (describing the
development and historical antecedents of the employment-at-will rule).
72. Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519–20 (1884).
73. See Befort, supra note 5, at 404–06.
74. Convention No. 158 Concerning Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the
Employer, June 22, 1982, 1412 U.N.T.S. I-23645.
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both statutory and common law limitations on the at-will doctrine. On the
statutory side, federal statutes imposed the most significant limitations,
prohibiting discrimination based on such characteristics as race,75
gender,76 age,77 and disability.78 Meanwhile, primarily during the 1980s
and 1990s, state courts adopted three judge-made limitations as described
below.
Most jurisdictions permit an employee to maintain a tort action
claiming that a discharge decision offends public policy.79 Courts have
held that public policy considerations bar employers from terminating
employees who refuse to commit an unlawful act,80 exercise statutory
rights,81 perform a public function,82 or report an employer’s unlawful
conduct.83 With respect to the last type of conduct, a number of
jurisdictions also have enacted statutes specifically prohibiting employee
discharges for such “whistleblowing” activities.84

75. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(b) (2012)
(prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race).
76. See id. (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex).
77. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2012)
(prohibiting discrimination on the basis of age).
78. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012) (prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of disability).
79. See Befort, supra note 5, at 381–82; Michael A. Chagares, Utilization of the Disclaimer
as an Effective Means to Define the Employment Relationship, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 365, 400–05
(1989) (citing forty-three states as recognizing the public policy cause of action).
80. See, e.g., Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569, 571 (Minn. 1987) (refusal
to violate antipollution laws by dispensing leaded gas into cars designed for unleaded gas);
Tameny v. Atl. Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1333–34 (Cal. 1980) (refusal to participate in an
unlawful price-fixing scheme); Remington Freight Lines, Inc. v. Larkey, 644 N.E.2d 931, 938
(Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (refusal to drive an illegally overloaded truck).
81. See, e.g., Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co., 416 S.E.2d 166, 173 (N.C. 1992) (finding
public policy cause of action for employee who was fired for refusing to work for less than the
statutory minimum wage); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353, 357 (Ill. 1978) (finding
public policy cause of action for employee discharged for filing workers’ compensation claim).
82. See, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 517 (Or. 1975) (recognizing public policy claim
for employee terminated because of desire to serve jury duty).
83. See, e.g., Fox v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 931 P.2d 857, 862 (Utah 1997) (finding public
policy cause of action for employee who was discharged for informing law enforcement
authorities of fraudulent sales practices); Palmateer v. Int’l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 881
(Ill. 1981) (finding public policy claim for employee discharged for reporting criminal conduct to
authorities); Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385, 389 (Conn. 1980) (finding
public policy cause of action for employee who was discharged for reporting labeling
misrepresentations to employer).
84. See, e.g., The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, 5 U.S.C. § 2301(b)(9) (2012)
(protecting federal employees from retaliation for whistleblowing); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§§ 15.361–.369 (2016) (protecting both private- and public-sector employees from retaliation for
blowing the whistle on illegal acts); see also MARK ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT
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As I identified in an earlier article, the majority of states also recognize
a contract-based exception to the at-will employment rule.85 The courts
in these states imply contractual obligations, such as some form of job
security or disciplinary procedure, from an employer’s unilateral promise
such as one expressed in an employee handbook or policy statement.86
Finally, a few jurisdictions go further and read a covenant of good
faith and fair dealing into employment agreements.87 This covenant
requires that each party in an employment relationship refrain from acting
in bad faith so as to frustrate one another’s expectations of receiving the
benefits of their bargain.88
Since the turn of the century, however, courts have whittled down the
scope of these three common law claims. State courts have employed a
variety of strategies in cabining the reach of the public policy tort claim.
Three examples are illustrative.
First, a number of decisions have refused to extend the public policy
tort claim beyond its basic origins. The Minnesota Supreme Court, for
example, has ruled that the public policy exception does not apply to a
termination in response to an employee’s application for unemployment
benefits.89 Even though a number of jurisdictions recognize a public
policy claim in favor of an employee terminated for exercising a statutory
right, the Minnesota court determined that the common law claim in that
state was limited to an employee’s good faith refusal to violate a statute.90
Similarly, in Bammert v. Don’s Super Valu, Inc.,91 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court declined to find a public policy claim in an employer’s
retaliatory termination of an employee whose husband arrested the

LAW 923 (4th ed. 1998) (reporting that 37 states have enacted some form of statutory protection
for employees reporting illegal activity).
85. See Befort, supra note 5, at 382; Chagares, supra note 79, at 400–05 (citing forty-one
states as recognizing an implied contract exception to the at-will rule).
86. See, e.g., Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 505 N.E.2d 314, 317 (Ill.
1987) (finding that an employee handbook may be contractually binding); Wooley v. HoffmanLa Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1258 (N.J. 1985) (finding that an implied disclaimer in an
employee handbook is enforceable without a clear disclaimer); see also Befort, supra note 5, at
382.
87. See Befort, supra note 5, at 382; see, e.g., Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000, 1003
(Alaska 1983) (ruling against an employer who discharged an employee in effort to avoid profitsharing liability); K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364, 1365 (Nev. 1987) (ruling against an
employer who dismissed an employee in an effort to avoid retirement benefit payments).
88. See Befort, supra note 5, at 382; see, e.g., Fortune v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 364
N.E.2d 1251, 1253 (Mass. 1977) (holding in favor of salesman fired by employer in an attempt to
avoid paying future bonus payments under a contractual arrangement).
89. Dukowitz v. Hannon Sec. Servs., 841 N.W.2d 147, 148 (Minn. 2014).
90. Id. at 151.
91. 646 N.W.2d 365 (Wis. 2002).
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employer’s spouse for driving while intoxicated.92 While a dissenting
opinion argued in favor of “a strong public policy in vigorous
enforcement of the law,”93 the majority opinion cited “[l]ine-drawing”
concerns about protecting conduct undertaken by someone other than the
terminated employee.94
Second, some courts have ruled that protection for whistleblowing
applies only to reports of behavior prohibited by statute but not to conduct
that is fraudulent or reprehensible.95 The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit, applying Minnesota law, ruled that the state’s
Whistleblower Act would not protect reports alleging practices that were
“wrong,” “unethical,” “decept[ive],” and “fraud[ulent].”96
Third, some states will not forbid retaliation against employees who
report illegal conduct if the illegality primarily implicates private
interests as opposed to truly important public concerns.97 In this regard,
the Iowa Supreme Court has held that a report of illegal conduct will be
protected only if it “captures the communal conscience and common
sense of our state in matters of public health, safety, morals, and general
welfare.”98 This approach empowers judges to decide that some
whistleblowing reports are worthy of protection while others are not.
While the courts have marginally limited the reach of the public policy
exception, they have eviscerated the other two common law claims.
Although it is true that most jurisdictions have recognized that unilateral
employer statements, such as those contained in employee handbooks,
may contain enforceable promises,99 the widespread use of disclaimers
has largely negated that effect in practice. Generally speaking, a
disclaimer is a provision within a policy document that states that nothing
contained in the document should be construed as a contract and that the
employment relationship may be terminated on an at-will basis.100 A
substantial majority of U.S. courts find that a clearly stated disclaimer
will bar the enforcement of employer policy statements.101 In accordance
92. Id. at 367.
93. Id. at 373 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 372.
95. See, e.g., Dean v. Consol. Equities Realty, LLC, 914 N.E.2d 1109, 1113 (Ohio Ct. App.
2009).
96. Chial v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 569 F.3d 850, 853–55 (8th Cir. 2009).
97. See, e.g., Lamson v. Crater Lake Motors, Inc., 216 P.3d 852, 858 (Or. 2009); Barker v.
State Ins. Fund, 40 P.3d 463, 470 (Okla. 2001).
98. Berry v. Liberty Holdings, Inc., 803 N.W.2d 106, 110 (Iowa 2011).
99. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
100. See Chagares, supra note 79, at 386.
101. See Bryce Yoder, How Reasonable Is “Reasonable”? The Search for a Satisfactory
Approach to Employment Handbooks, 57 DUKE L.J. 1517, 1535 (2008); see, e.g., Boulton v. Inst.
of Int’l Educ., 808 A.2d 499, 505 (D.C. 2002); Phipps v. IASD Health Servs. Corp., 558 N.W.2d
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with prevailing unilateral contract analysis, this result follows because
the disclaimer effectively nullifies any construction of a handbook or
other policy statement as an enforceable offer.102 In addition, a clear
majority of states find that an employer may modify or revoke previously
issued policy statements on a unilateral basis.103 As a result, very few
policy statements are enforceable via the contract-based exception.104
Most states have declined to recognize the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing as a limitation on an employer’s at-will prerogative. Some
courts have decided not to recognize the covenant because of the
difficulty in determining the subjective bad faith element. 105 More
commonly, courts have rejected the covenant claim on the grounds that it
is inherently inconsistent with the at-will presumption.106
Even in those states that have recognized the covenant claim, courts
have curtailed its utility. The California case of Guz v. Bechtel National,
Inc.107 is a decision on point.108 In that case, an employee challenged his
discharge by asserting both an implied contract claim and a covenant of
good faith and fair dealing claim.109 The California Supreme Court ruled
that a covenant claim is “either inapplicable or superfluous” in that
context.110 The claim is inapplicable because it cannot create any new or
different rights than those provided by the underlying contract claim.111
And it is superfluous in that the remedy for breach of the covenant is
limited to the same contract-based remedies as the implied contract
claim.112 In essence, under Guz, a covenant claim adds value only if the
198, 204 (Iowa 1997); Massey v. Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp., 917 So. 2d 833, 841 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2005).
102. See Stephen F. Befort, Employee Handbooks and the Legal Effect of Disclaimers, 13
INDUS. REL. L.J. 326, 348–49 (1992); Yoder, supra note 101, at 1535.
103. See Brian T. Kohn, Note, Contracts of Convenience: Preventing Employers from
Unilaterally Modifying Promises Made in Employee Handbooks, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 799, 819
(2003). But cf. Demasse v. ITT Corp., 984 P.2d 1138, 1144–46 (Ariz. 1999) (requiring mutual
assent and additional consideration to support such a change).
104. See Matthew W. Finkin et al., Working Group on Chapter 2 of the Proposed
Restatement of Employment Law: Employment Contracts: Termination, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL’Y J. 93, 125 (2009).
105. See, e.g., Parner v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 629 (Haw. 1982) (rejecting
the covenant because it would necessitate “judicial incursions into the amorphous concept of bad
faith”).
106. See, e.g., City of Midland v. O’Bryant, 18 S.W.3d 209, 213–14 (Tex. 2000); Nelson v.
Crimson Enters., Inc. 777 P.2d 73, 74 (Wyo. 1989); Jeffers v. Bishop Clarkson Mem’l Hosp., 387
N.W.2d 692, 695 (Neb. 1986).
107. 8 P.3d 1089 (Cal. 2000).
108. Id. at 1094.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1109.
111. Id. at 1110.
112. Id. at 1112 (citing Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988)).
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contractual promise being breached in bad faith involves something other
than a promise of job security or termination procedures.
In sum, the scope of common law limitations on wrongful discharge
has narrowed since the turn of the century. As contingent work rises and
unionization declines, the traditional expectation that good work will be
rewarded with employment longevity continues to ebb.113
D. Income Inequality
From the end of World War II into the 1970s, “substantial economic
growth and broadly shared prosperity” characterized the American
economy.114 However, beginning in the 1970s, income growth noticeably
slowed for middle and lower income households while it continued for
higher earning households.115 This trend has resulted in a sharp rise in
income inequality, which is now greater than at any time since the Great
Depression.116
The numbers tell a compelling story. Between 1979 and 2007, real
household income for the bottom quintile (20%) of the American
population income group grew at a relatively weak rate of 10.8%.117 In
contrast, real income growth for the top-earning quintile grew at a much
more robust 88.7%.118 Even more dramatically, the top 5% of families
realized average gains of 145.7%.119 In terms of their respective shares of
total household income growth during that period, 74.5% was attributable
to gains realized by the highest-earning quintile, while only 0.7% was
attributable to gains realized by the lowest-earning quintile.120
As of 2011, the top quintile of household earners garnered more than
half (51.1%) of total U.S. income, with the top 5% alone accounting for
22.3%.121 In contrast, the bottom quintile accounted for a meager 3.2%

113. See Befort, supra note 5, at 388–91 (discussing the decline of the social contract
underpinning long-term employment relationships).
114. CHAD STONE ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, A GUIDE TO STATISTICS
ON HISTORICAL TRENDS IN INCOME INEQUALITY 1 (2016), http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/
atoms/files/11-28-11pov_1.pdf.
115. Id.; Drew Desilver, U.S. Income Inequality, on Rise for Decades, Is Now Highest Since
1928, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/12/05/u-sincome-inequality-on-rise-for-decades-is-now-highest-since-1928/#.
116. STONE ET AL., supra note 114, at 1; Desilver, supra note 115.
117. LAWRENCE MISCHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 108 (12th ed. 2012).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See id. at 24.
121. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL INCOME TABLES: HOUSEHOLDS, TABLE H-2 (Sept.
13, 2016), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/historicalincome-households.html.
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of total income.122 A particularly startling snapshot of this trend is that
chief executive officers of major U.S. companies earned approximately
277 times more than the average worker in 2007, representing a more
than seven-fold increase since 1979.123
This inequality is even more drastic in light of the impact of
productivity and taxation. Between 1973 and 2011, U.S. workforce
productivity grew by 80.4%.124 This figure exceeded the real income
growth of the bottom quintile of households by more than seven times
(10.7%), and more than doubled the median growth of household income
(39.2%) over this period.125 This disparity is even more pronounced given
that 85.9% of the income growth for the middle fifth of American
workers resulted from increased hours of work as opposed to increases in
hourly compensation.126 Clearly, capital rather than labor
disproportionately enjoyed the fruits of this increased productivity.
Meanwhile, U.S. income tax rates have become considerably less
progressive.127 As chronicled by the Economic Policy Institute,
“[e]ffective tax rates by income fifth have converged rapidly in recent
years, and average federal tax rates for the top 1 percent of households
fell from 37.0 percent in 1979 to 29.5 percent in 2007.”128 A reduction in
progressive tax rates exacerbates income inequality by boosting the takehome pay of top earners relative to earners in other brackets.129
In terms of international comparisons, the United States has one of the
most unequal income distributions in the developed world, with the
fourth highest Gini coefficient among the 34 OECD countries.130 Once

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
WEIL, supra note 17, at 49.
MISCHEL ET AL., supra note 117, at 173, 237.
See id.
Id. at 35, 123.
See JOEL FRIEDMAN ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES, RECENT TAX AND
INCOME
TRENDS
AMONG
HIGH-INCOME
TAXPAYERS
1
(2006),
http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/4-10-06tax5.pdf (discussing the progressivity
of the individual income tax and the increasing burden the taxpayers bear as a result of tax cuts);
see generally Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, How Progressive Is the U.S. Federal Tax
System? A Historical and International Perspective, 21 J. ECON. PERSPS. 3 (2007) (discussing the
three changes the federal tax system has undergone and the impact this has had on its
progressivity).
128. MISCHEL ET AL., supra note 117, at 87.
129. BEFORT & BUDD, supra note 1, at 73–74.
130. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., IN IT TOGETHER: WHY LESS EQUALITY
BENEFITS ALL 20, 56 (2015) (the Gini Index provides a summary statistical measure of
income inequality), http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/employment/init-together-why-less-inequality-benefits-all_9789264235120-en#.WTCq8hPyv-Y.
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the impact of taxes and transfers are taken into account, the United States
jumps to second place, behind only Chile.131
The gap between high-end and low-end earners has grown since the
turn of the century. In 2000, the lowest quintile of earners received 3.6%
of aggregate income while the highest quintile received 49.8% of
aggregate income.132 By 2014, these shares were 3.1% and 51.2%,
respectively.133
The factors contributing to the growing income inequality in the
United States include a number of those discussed in this Article, such as
globalization, the increase in contingent work, and declining union
density.134 Whatever the cause, the continuing increase in income
inequality is a matter of concern, diminishing the American dream and
creating for many an unsustainable lifestyle of acute stress.135
E. The American Worker Time Crunch
The time that workers devote to work has substantially increased over
the past few decades. Two parallel forces have led this surge. First, many
women who were full-time caregivers in the past have joined the
workforce and now divide their time between family care and paid work.
Second, workers across the board are putting in significantly more time
at work.136
1. The Working Family Caregiver and the FMLA
The typical family of 1970 consisted of a breadwinner dad and a stayat-home mom.137 Today, dual-earner and single-earner households
predominate. By 2000, dual-earner couples represented a solid majority
of all married couples,138 and the proportion of families headed by a

131. See Drew Desilver, Global Inequality: How the U.S. Compares, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec.
19, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/12/19/global-inequality-how-the-u-scompares/.
132. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 121.
133. Id.
134. See generally MISCHEL ET AL., supra note 117, at 241–86.
135. BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED: ON (NOT) GETTING BY IN AMERICA 212–
14 (2001).
136. See BEFORT & BUDD, supra note 1, at 68.
137. JERRY A. JACOBS & KATHLEEN GERSON, THE TIME DIVIDE: WORK, FAMILY AND GENDER
INEQUALITY 43–44 (2004) (finding that 51.4% of all households in 1970 fit into this category).
138. Id. at 43 (reporting that dual-earner couples represented 59.6% of all married couples
in 2000); see KIM PARKER & WENDY WANG, PEW RESEARCH CTR., MODERN PARENTHOOD:
ROLES OF MOMS AND DADS CONVERGE AS THEY BALANCE WORK AND FAMILY 4 (2013),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2013/03/FINAL_modern_parenthood_03-2013.pdf
(finding approximately 60% of two-parent households with children have two working parents).
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single working mother jumped from 9.9% in 1970 to 21.9% in 2000.139
One of the most significant characteristics of the new work/family
structure is that women, the principal caregivers of the former model,
have joined men in working outside the home. In 1975, 39% of women
with children under the age of six were in the labor force.140 By 2000,
that share had risen to 65%.141 The average number of hours worked by
women has essentially doubled since the 1960s.142
Thus, in the new typical arrangement of the twenty-first century, both
mom and dad engage in paid work. Yet, with women still bearing the bulk
of family caregiving chores, the competing pressures of work and family
serve to dampen disproportionately the long-term work attachment of
female workers.143
As I described in an earlier article:
The federal government’s principal attempt at providing
some balance to the pressures of work and family was the
enactment of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993.
The FMLA entitles eligible employees to a total of twelve
weeks of leave per twelve-month period: (a) to care for a
newborn child or a child newly placed with the employee for
adoption or foster care; (b) to care for an employee’s child,
parent, or spouse with a serious health condition; or (c) to
care for an employee’s own serious health condition. The
FMLA requires the employer to maintain health insurance
coverage during the leave period and to return the employee
to his or her previous position or to a position with
equivalent benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of
employment following the end of the leave period.
Significantly, FMLA mandated leave is unpaid in nature.144

139.
140.
141.
142.

JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 137, at 51.
PARKER & WANG, supra note 138, at 10.
Id.
BLS REPORTS, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: A
HANDBOOK 1 (2014), https://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-databook-2013.pdf. John A. Knowles, Why
Are Married Men Working So Much? An Aggregate Analysis of Intra-Household Bargaining and
Labour Supply, 80 REV. ECON. STUD. 1055, 1060–61 (2013).
143. See Stephen F. Befort, Accommodation at Work: Lessons from the Americans with
Disabilities Act and Possibilities for Alleviating the American Worker Time Crunch, 13 CORNELL
J.L. PUB. POL’Y 615, 620 (2004); see also JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY
DEBATE: WHY MEN AND CLASS MATTER 1 (2010); Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap:
Employment Discrimination Law, Women’s Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and
Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 371, 386–87 (2001); Claire Cain Miller & Liz
Alderman, Why U.S. Women Are Leaving Jobs Behind, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/14/upshot/us-employment-women-not-working.html?_r=0.
144. Befort, supra note 143, at 620–21 (footnotes omitted).
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As a vehicle for balancing work and family demands, the FMLA has
three major shortcomings. First, because of its complex coverage
formula,145 FMLA protections do not extend to more than 40% of U.S.
workers.146 Second, subtle and not-so-subtle pressures from both
employers and society influence otherwise eligible employees not to take
their full leave allowance.147 Potential leave takers—especially men—
worry that taking leave may be perceived as a lack of dedication to work
and harm career prospects.148 Finally, in contrast to virtually all other
industrialized countries, FMLA leave in the United States is unpaid.149
As a result, many American workers do not take leave because they
cannot afford to do so.150 This group of non-leave takers is
disproportionately single, non-salaried, and with children at home.151
2. The Pervasive Worker Time Crunch
The problem of balancing work and non-work time demands is not
limited solely to caregivers. American workers generally are

145. To be eligible for FMLA leave, an employee must have been employed by their current
employer for at least twelve months, worked at least 1,250 hours for that employer during the
preceding twelve-month period, and be employed at a worksite having fifty or more employees.
29 U.S.C. §§ 2611(2)(A)–(B), 2611(4) (2012); 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.110–.111.
146. See ABT ASSOCS., INC., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE IN 2012:
TECHNICAL REPORT 1–2 (2012), https://www.dol.gov/asp/evaluation/fmla/FMLA-2012Technical-Report.pdf.
147. See Symposium, Law Firms as Defendants: Family Responsibilities Discrimination in
Legal Workplaces, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 393, 404–11 (2007) (providing examples of employer
retaliation for employees taking or seeking leave for family care purposes); Claire Cain Miller &
David Streitfeld, Big Leaps for Parental Leave, if Workers Actually Take It, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/02upshot/big-leaps-for-parental-leave-if-workersactually-follow-through.html?_r=2 (describing pressures against exercising leave rights).
148. See Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1047, 1077–79
(1994) (describing employer hostility and peer pressure as factors that discourage men from taking
leave); Lauren Weber, Why Dads Don’t Take Paternity Leave, WALL ST. J. (June 12, 2013),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324049504578541633708283670?alg=y&mg=
id-wsj (describing social stigma that inhibits taking leave for family care purposes).
149. See OECD FAMILY DATABASE, KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF PARENTAL LEAVE SYSTEMS 2
(2016), http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/PF2_1_Parental_leave_systems.pdf; Gretchen Livingston,
Among 41 Nations, U.S. Is the Outlier When It Comes to Paid Parental Leave, PEW RES. CENTER
(Sept. 26, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/26/u-s-lacks-mandated-paidparental-leave/.
150. WESTAT, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BALANCING THE NEEDS OF FAMILIES AND EMPLOYERS:
FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE SURVEYS § 2.2.4 (2000), https://www.dol.gov/whd/fmla/toc.pdf
(survey reporting that among those employees who desired to take family or medical leave in
2000, the most common reason (77.6%) for not taking leave was not being able to afford it);
Gillian Lester, A Defense of Paid Family Leave, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 3 n.7 (2005).
151. See WESTAT, supra note 150, at § 2.2.3.
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experiencing a significant and growing time-crunch phenomenon that
comes with its own set of problems.
The number of hours American employees work has increased
dramatically in the past few decades. The average full-time American
employee now works approximately 180 more hours each year as
compared to thirty-five years ago.152 The increase in total family unit
working time is even greater, with the average American household
tallying more than 220 additional hours of paid work per year during this
span.153 That amounts to five and one-half additional weeks of full-time
work each year by the adult members of the average U.S. household. U.S.
workers put in relatively long average working hours by comparison to
other industrialized countries.154 A 2009 analysis of working hours in
thirteen OECD countries, for example, depicted the United States as
having the second highest average number of annual hours worked,
trailing only South Korea.155 That study also revealed that the average
American employee worked approximately 300 more hours per year than
workers in Germany and France.156
Some of this discrepancy results from the fact that Americans have
access to less vacation than do workers in other countries.157 Nearly all
Western European countries statutorily mandate minimum annual
vacation periods of four to six weeks.158 In contrast, the average

152. Lawrence Mischel, Vast Majority of Wage Earners Are Working Harder, and for Not
Much More, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.epi.org/publication/ib348-trends-uswork-hours-wages-1979-2007/.
153. MISCHEL ET AL., supra note 117, at 37 (documenting an increase of 222 household
working hours per year from 1979 to 2007); Elise Gold, Longer Hours, Not Higher Wages, Have
Driven Modest Earnings Growth for Most American Households, ECON. POL’Y INST. (July
23, 2015), http://www.epi.org/publication/longer-hours-not-higher-wages-have-driven-modestearnings-growth-for-most-american-households/ (reporting an annual increase of 289 hours per
average household from 1979 to 2007).
154. SANGHEON LEE ET AL., INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, WORKING TIME AROUND THE WORLD:
TRENDS IN WORKING HOURS, LAW AND POLICIES IN A GLOBAL COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 26
(2009).
155. See SUSAN E. FLECK, MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF
HOURS WORKED: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE STATISTICS, 31 (2009), https://www.bls.gov/opub/
mlr/2009/05/art1full.pdf.
156. See id.; see also OECD STAT, AVERAGE ANNUAL HOURS ACTUALLY WORKED PER
WORKER (2017), https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=ANHRS. (reporting the annual
hours worked per person employed in 2002 to be 1,810 in the United States, 1,431 in Germany,
and 1,487 in France).
157. See Befort, supra note 143, at 630.
158. See Richard N. Block, Work-Family Legislation in the United States, Canada, and
Western Europe: A Quantitative Analysis, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 333, 340–43 (2007); Phyllis T.
Bookspan, A Delicate Imbalance—Family and Work, 5 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 37, 73 (1995).
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American worker in the private industry receives two to three weeks of
paid vacation per year.159
A number of factors have contributed to this rise in working hours.160
First, since the late 1970s, the real hourly wages earned by American
employees have been relatively stagnant, with real wages actually
decreasing between 1979 and 2007 for workers in the bottom decile for
annual income.161 Accordingly, many employees are working more hours
in order to maintain household income levels.162
Employers also have financial incentives to squeeze more working
time out of their employees. One such incentive prompts employers to
require salaried employees to work longer hours. Salaried employees are
exempt from the overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA),163 and employers do not incur increased costs by requiring
salaried employees to work additional hours.
Similarly, the increasing cost of employee benefits encourages
employers to require longer work weeks. The growth in such benefits has
far outpaced that of wages in the past half century. In 1948, employerpaid benefits accounted for only 5.1% of employee compensation, but by
2011, such benefits constituted 19.8% of compensation.164 The costs of
these fringe benefits are usually fixed for a full-time employee without
regard to how many hours the employee actually works, and employers
have an economic incentive to meet labor needs by increasing the number
of hours worked rather than by increasing the number of employees.165
3. Implications of the Worker Time Crunch
As employees spend more time at work and fewer families operate
under the breadwinner/homemaker model, workers increasingly are
caught in a serious time crunch. Work and family obligations are
competing for a shrinking amount of free time. This work/family tension
is further exacerbated for the growing portion of the work force who must
navigate irregular and unpredictable work schedules.166 In short, the
159. Robert W. Van Giezen, Paid Leave in Private Industry Over the Past 20 Years, U.S.
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Aug. 2013), http://www.bls.gov/opub/btn/volume-2/paid-leavein-private-industry-over-the-past-20-years.htm.
160. Befort, supra note 143, at 631–32.
161. Mischel, supra note 152.
162. Id.
163. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 541.1–.3.
164. MISCHEL ET AL., supra note 117, at 181.
165. Belinda M. Smith, Time Norms in the Workplace: Their Exclusionary Effect and
Potential for Change, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 271, 284 (2002).
166. See Lonnie Golden, Irregular Work Scheduling and Its Consequences, ECON. POL’Y
INST. (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.epi.org/publication/irregular-work-scheduling-and-itsconsequences.html.
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worker time crunch translates into less leisure time167 and more stress.168
In contrast to the other measures of worker fortunes, this dimension is
the only one not to worsen demonstrably in the years since 2000.
Available data shows that the average number of hours annually worked
by American workers actually decreased slightly during this period,
beginning with the period of the Great Recession in 2009.169
F. Retirement Security
The components of a financially secure retirement are often
analogized to a three-legged stool.170 Legs representing three sources of
retirement income support the financial platform of the stool: (1) Social
Security; (2) pension plans; and (3) personal savings.171 With shortfalls
projected for all three legs, the financial prospects for future retirees are
looking more shaky than secure.172
1. Social Security
It is well known that a budgetary train wreck looms on the horizon for
the Social Security system.173 The 2015 Annual Report of the Social
Security and Medicare Boards of Trustees provides a snapshot of the
problem.174 Beginning in 2020, total Social Security benefit outlays will
exceed projected tax revenues and interest income.175 This negative
balance will continue to worsen over time with the result of the combined
Social Security Trust Fund being fully exhausted by 2034.176 Over the
course of the seventy-five-year projection period, Social Security will fall
167. Stephanie Armour, U.S. Workers Feel Burn of Long Hours, Less Leisure, USA TODAY
(Dec. 18, 2003), https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/workplace/2003-12-16-hourscover_x.htm.
168. See JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 137, at 84 (reporting that 55.5% of women and
59.8% of men experience some conflict in balancing work, personal life, and family life); PARKER
& WANG, supra note 138 (reporting that 56% of working mothers and 50% of working fathers
find it to be difficult to balance work and family).
169. See OECD STAT, supra note 156.
170. See, e.g., Andrew A. Samwick, The Effects of Social Security Reform on Private
Pensions, in PRIVATE PENSIONS AND PUBLIC POLICIES 189, 190 (William G. Gale et al. eds., 2004).
171. Stephen F. Befort, The Perfect Storm of Retirement Insecurity: Fixing the Three-Legged
Stool of Social Security, Pensions, and Personal Savings, 91 MINN. L. REV. 938, 939 (2007).
172. Id.
173. Star Parker, Latest Evidence of a Social Security Train Wreck, WND (July 5, 2016),
http://www.wnd.com/2016/07/latest-evidence-of-a-social-security-train-wreck/ (noting the
“dramatic” fiscal issues currently facing the Social Security program).
174. See generally SOC. SEC. AND MEDICARE BOARDS OF TRS., STATUS OF THE SOCIAL
SECURITY AND MEDICARE PROGRAMS: A SUMMARY OF THE 2015 ANNUAL REPORTS (2015),
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/TRSUM/tr15summary.pdf.
175. Id. at 9.
176. Id. at 12.
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$11.1 trillion short of the funding necessary to maintain current benefit
levels.177
Much of this shortfall has to do with demographic changes affecting
the size of the benefit-receiving cohort as compared to the size of the
wage-earning, taxpayer cohort.178 Two principal factors impact this
equation. The first is increasing life spans. When the federal government
set the retirement age at sixty-five in the 1930s, the average American
life expectancy at birth was fifty-eight years for men and sixty-two years
for women.179 Today, life expectancy in the United States is
approximately seventy-eight years.180 Second, the number of new baby
boom retirees will far outpace the projected growth in the number of
future wage earners.181
Unless some solution is adopted, retirees will receive only 79% of
scheduled benefits in 2034, and this percentage will continue to decrease
for the remainder of the seventy-five-year projection period.182 This
decline will have a severe impact on the many Americans who depend on
Social Security benefits as their principal source of retirement income. At
present, the Social Security program provides more than one-half of all
income for 66% of retirees and constitutes the sole source of income for
21% of current beneficiaries.183 While some combination of increased
taxation, reduced benefits, and a change in the full-retirement age could
provide a long-term solution, the requisite political will for such a
compromise remains out of reach.184

177. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM: ANSWERS TO KEY
QUESTIONS 23 (2015).
178. See Befort, supra note 171, at 943–44.
179. Social Security History, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/history/
lifeexpect.html (last visited June 1, 2017).
180. INFOPLEASE, Life Expectancy at Birth by Race and Sex, 1930-2010,
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0005148.html (last visited June 1, 2017).
181. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 177, at 22, 27–29; PETER A. DIAMOND
& PETER R. ORSZAG, SAVING SOCIAL SECURITY: A BALANCED APPROACH, 74–77 (2004). While
the number of retirees is projected to grow by 90% between 2000 and 2030, the number of wageearning taxpayers is projected to grow by only 15%. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY: A
PRIMER 31–32 (Sept. 2001), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/32xx/
doc3213/entirereport.pdf. As a result, the number of workers per beneficiaries will drop from a
ratio of 3.3 to a ratio of 2.0 by 2030. Stephen C. Goss, The Future Financial Status of the Social
Security Program, SOC. SECURITY BULL. (2010), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v70n3/
v70n3p111.html.
182. SOC. SECURITY AND MEDICARE BOARDS OF TRS., supra note 174, at 10.
183. SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE SOCIAL
SECURITY BULLETIN 11 (2008), http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2007/
supplement07.pdf.
184. See Befort, supra note 171, at 945.
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2. Pension Plans
My 2007 article on retirement security also provided this description
of basic pension plan design:
Pensions in the United States fall into two broad
categories: defined benefit plans and defined contribution
plans. Traditional defined benefit plans provide a
predetermined, specified retirement benefit, usually in the
form of a life annuity, linked to pre-retirement
earnings. . . . Defined benefit plans typically are funded
solely by the sponsoring employer, and plan contributions
are held in a single trust on behalf of all participants.
Defined contribution plans, such as employer-sponsored
401(k) plans, in contrast, promise only a contribution rate to
an employee’s individual account, and both employers and
employees typically contribute to such plans. Individual
workers must make a number of key decisions concerning
defined contribution plans, such as whether to participate,
how much to contribute, how to allocate investments, and
when and how to withdraw funds.
A crucial distinction between the two plan types concerns
which party bears the investment risk associated with plan
assets. In defined benefit plans, the employer bears the risk
of investment shortfalls, while in defined contribution plans,
individual employees bear this risk.185
The most significant problem with the current pension regime in the
United States is the lack of overall coverage. While estimates vary by
methodology, most studies agree that less than half of all private-sector
workers in the United States currently participate in an employersponsored pension plan.186 Moreover, the participation rate has been
declining. Since 2000, private-sector participation has fallen by
approximately 4–7%.187 Put another way, more than seventy million
185. Id. at 946–47 (footnotes omitted).
186. See id. at 953–55; U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, NATIONAL
COMPENSATION SURVEY: EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES,
MARCH 2015 (2015) (48%); CRAIG COPELAND, EMP’T BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., EMPLOYMENTBASED RETIREMENT PLAN PARTICIPATION: GEOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES AND TRENDS 9 (2014),
https://www.ebri.org/pdf/EBRI_IB_405_Oct14.RetPart.pdf; ALICIA MUNNELL & DINA
BLECKMAN, CTR FOR RETIREMENT RESEARCH AT B.C., IS PENSION COVERAGE A PROBLEM IN THE
PRIVATE SECTOR? 2 (2014), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/IB_14-7-508.pdf
(reporting participation at 43% based on data from U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population
Survey).
187. See COPELAND, supra note 186, at 27 (reporting a decrease of 3.6%); MONIQUE
MORISSEY, ECON. POLICY INST., THE STATE OF AMERICAN RETIREMENT: HOW 401(K)S HAVE
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American workers face the prospect of retirement with no pension leg on
their already shaky retirement stool.188
One of the factors contributing to decreased pension coverage is the
continued decline in the number of defined benefit plans sponsored by
private employers. In 1980, 38% of private-sector workers participated in
a defined benefit plan, but that proportion plummeted to 15% by 2015.189
The principal motivation for employers to jettison defined benefit plans
is to avoid funding and administrative costs while shifting the risk of
investment loss to employees.190
Participation is also diluted in the growing number of defined
contribution plans. The total number of U.S. employees participating in
defined contribution plans grew more than five-fold from 1975 to
2012.191 But more than one-fifth of all employees covered by an
employer-sponsored 401(k) plan choose not to participate in that plan.192
The transformation of the U.S. pension environment from one
dominated by defined benefit plans to one dominated by defined
contribution plans193 comes with its own set of problems. Since defined
FAILED MOST AMERICAN WORKERS 8 (2016), http://www.epi.org/files/state-of-americanretirement-final.pdf (reporting a decrease of 7%).
188. COPELAND, supra note 186, at 30.
189. Michael Molinski, Disappearing Pensions Hurt U.S. Economy as Well as Workers,
USA TODAY (Apr. 23, 2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2016/04/23/pensionseconomy-workers/83292892/; see also William J. Wiatrowski, The Last Private Industry Pension
Plans: A Visual Essay, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3–4 (Dec. 2012) (reporting a similar drop in private
sector defined benefit plans from 35% in the early 1990s to 18% in 2011).
190. Jack VanDerhei, Issue Brief No. 291: Defined Benefit Plan Freezes: Who’s Affected,
How Much, and Replacing Lost Accruals, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. 6 (2006),
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_03-20063.pdf.
191. COPELAND, supra note 186, at 6–7.
192. ALICIA H. MUNNELL ET AL., CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RESEARCH AT B.C., THE PENSION
COVERAGE PROBLEM IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 1 (2012), http://crr.bc.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2012/09/IB_12-16-508.pdf (reporting that 21% of covered employees choose not
to participate). This negative choice typically reflects inertia, an inability to pay, or a conscious
choice to prefer current disposable income over deferred retirement benefits, even when
participation is incentivized by an employer’s promise of a matching contribution. See ALICIA
MUNNELL & ANNIKA SUNDEN, COMING UP SHORT: THE CHALLENGE OF 401(K) PLANS 55–67
(2004); James F. Moore & Olivia S. Mitchell, Projected Retirement Wealth and Savings
Adequacy, in FORECASTING RETIREMENT NEEDS AND RETIREMENT WEALTH 68, 87 (Olivia S.
Mitchel et al. eds., 2000). The prevalence of non-participation has actually decreased since the
Pension Protection Act of 2006 removed barriers to permitting employers to automatically enroll
employees in 401(k) plans. See generally Barbara A. Butrica & Nadia S. Karamcheva, Automatic
Enrollment, Employer Match Rates, and Employee Compensation in 401(k) Plans, MONTHLY
LAB. REV. (May 2015), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2015/article/automatic-enrollmentemployer-match-rates-and-employee-compensation-in-401k-plans-1.htm.
193. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, RETIREMENT SECURITY: MOST HOUSEHOLDS
APPROACHING RETIREMENT HAVE LOW SAVINGS 6 (2015) (stating that three-quarters of private-
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contribution plans utilize self-managed individual accounts, “[they]
demand that [beneficiaries and] retirees make complex financial
decisions that they are often poorly prepared to make.”194 As a result,
defined contribution participants often save too little, invest poorly, and
do not properly manage post-retirement assets.195 Coupled with the fact
that employees frequently move in and out of coverage with job changes,
many defined benefit recipients approaching retirement have amassed far
smaller accumulations than would have been projected under optimal
circumstances.196
Even public employees have experienced a recent deterioration in
their pension status. Admittedly, public employees have a higher rate of
pension coverage and a higher rate of defined benefit plan
participation.197 But economic and political pressure during the Great
Recession has led to forty-one states enacting significant changes to at
least one state retirement plan.198 These changes generally either
increased employee contributions or provided for a reduction in benefits
and/or cost-of-living adjustments.199
3. Personal Savings
The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), a division of the U.S.
Commerce Department, has tracked personal savings data since 1929.
The annual personal savings rate depicts the amount of disposable income
sector pension participants in 1975 had defined benefit plans, but less than one-third did so as of
2012).
194. Jeremy R. Cooper, Are Defined Contribution Pension Plans Fit for Purpose in
Retirement?, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 511, 521 (2014); see also Susan J. Stabile, The Behavior of
Defined Contribution Plan Participants, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71, 88–89 (2002) (discussing how
defined contribution plan participants often lack the financial knowledge and literacy needed to
make important investment decisions).
195. See Cooper, supra note 194, at 521 (discussing how plan participants make poor saving,
investment, and budgeting decisions due to internal framing mechanisms); Collen E. Medill,
Transforming the Role of the Social Security Administration, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 323, 329–31
(2007) (discussing the tendency of participants to make decisions having adverse consequences
because of psychological biases).
196. Alicia H. Munnell & Laura Quinby, Pension Coverage and Retirement Security, CTR.
FOR RETIREMENT RES. AT B.C. (2009) (reporting that a typical 401(k) participant approaching
retirement had only one-fourth of the accumulations projected for optimal participation
conditions).
197. See Wiatrowski, supra note 189, at 3.
198. See Eric M. Madiar, Public Pension Benefits Under Siege: Does State Law Facilitate
or Block Recent Efforts to Cut the Pension Benefits of Public Servants?, 27 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 179, 180 (2012).
199. Id.; see also Amy B. Monahan, Public Pension Plan Reform: The Legal Framework, 5
EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y 617, 618 (2010) (discussing the legal status of pension obligations in the
various states and the legality of legislation modifying those obligations).
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that is not expended in personal outlays over the course of a year.200 For
most of the period from 1974 to 1993, the personal savings rate hovered
in the range of 7–11%.201 However, the rate has declined over the past
twenty years to the 2–6% range.202 For 2015, the BEA reported a 5.1%
personal savings rate.203 This downturn in personal savings exacerbates
the impact of shortfalls in Social Security and employer-sponsored
pension programs.
Of course, capital gains obtained through the ownership of real estate
and stock equity holdings can offset some of the drop in personal
savings.204 However, even if the less predictable prospect of capital gains
are added to the personal resource reservoir, the combination still falls far
short of the combined savings rate of 15% recommended by many
experts.205 And, these gains tend to accrue primarily to top earners rather
than to future retirees as a class.206
4. Summary
Worker fortunes have also declined along this dimension since 2000.
The timeframe for averting a Social Security meltdown has narrowed,
while the cost of a short-term solution has increased. Fewer workers
participate in employer-sponsored pension plans, and the rate of personal
savings has declined. As a bottom line, the combination of increased
longevity and asset shortfalls suggests that about one-half of all
households are at risk of having insufficient retirement income to
maintain a desirable standard of living.207

200. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Personal
Income and Outlays, March 2016 (Apr. 29, 2016), https://bea.gov/newsreleases/national/
pi/2016/pi0316.htm.
201. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Annual
Personal Income, DPI, PCE and Personal Saving: Levels and Percent Changes (Apr. 29, 2016),
http://www.bea.gov/bea/newsreleases/national/pi/2016/pdf/pio316_hist.pdf.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See generally Michael K. Evans, Less-Than-Zero Savings? Don’t Believe It, 254
INDUSTRY WEEK 48 (Dec. 2005).
205. Jonathan Clements, Forget the Rule of Thumb: Saving 10% of Your Salary Is No Longer
Enough, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2005, at D1; Mary Beth Franklin, How Much Is Enough? 60
KIPLINGER’S PERS. FIN. 69, 70 (Feb. 2006).
206. See CHRISTIAN WELLER & EDWARD N. WOLFF, RETIREMENT INCOME: THE CRUCIAL
ROLE OF SOCIAL SECURITY 28 (2005).
207. See Befort, supra note 171, at 962; JACK VANDERHEI, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST.,
ISSUE BRIEF NO. 396: WHAT CAUSES EBRI RETIREMENT READINESS RATINGS TO VARY: RESULTS
FROM
THE
2014
RETIREMENT
SECURITY
PROJECTION
MODEL
6
(2014),
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_396_Feb14.RRRs2.pdf (finding approximately 42%
of households to be at risk).
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II. AGENDA FOR REFORM
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the status of American
labor and employment law has gone from being “badly skewed” in favor
of employer interests208 to being even more tilted in management’s favor.
Legal and public policy reforms are needed to correct this imbalance.
This Section provides an agenda of proposed reforms. This agenda is
not meant to be exhaustive or provide a detailed examination of the realm
of possible reforms. Instead, what follows is a checklist of recommended
reforms aimed at the issues raised by the six dimensions discussed in the
preceding section of this Article. And while it is clear that the political
will for such reform is currently lacking, that may (and should) change in
the future.
A. The Contingent Workforce
1. Extending Regulatory Protection to Dependent Contractors
The current tests for determining employee status for purposes of
protective regulation are cumbersome and inadequate. An approach that
a number of countries have adopted is to recognize a third category of
workers that falls in between that of employees and independent
contractors. These “dependent contractors” technically are not employees
under the traditional legal tests, but nonetheless are recognized as
deserving of some employee-like legal protections by virtue of working
in positions of economic dependence.209 Employment protection laws in
countries such as Canada,210 Sweden,211 Germany,212 and the
Netherlands,213 for example, treat dependent contractors similar to
employees for some purposes but not others. Ontario’s Labour Relations
Act provides a useful definition of a covered “dependent contractor” as:
208. Befort, supra note 5, at 422–23.
209. Id. at 454–55.
210. Brian A. Langille & Guy Davidov, Beyond Employees and Independent Contractors: A
View from Canada, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 7, 24–25 (1999). Compare Labour Relations
Act, S.O. 1995, ch. 1, sched. A, § 1(2) (Can.), and Drew Oliphant Prof’l Corp. v. Harrison, 2011
ABQB 216 (Can.), with Employment Standards Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, ch. 113, § 1(1) (Can.).
211. Ronnie Eklund, A Look at Contract Labour in the Nordic Countries, 18 COMP. LAB. L.
J. 229, 240–42 (1997); see also § 1 Lag Om Medbestämmande I Arbetslivet [Law on CoDetermination in the Workplace] (SFS 1976:580) (Swed.).
212. Wolfgang Daubler, Working People in Germany, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 77, 94–
95 (1999); see also Tarifvertragsgesetz [TVG] [Collective Bargaining Act], Sept. 9, 1949,
Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBl I] at 25, § 12a (Ger.); Arbeitsgerichtsgesetz [ArbGG] [Labour
Court Law], Aug. 9, 2015, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBl I] at 31, § 5 (Ger.).
213. Taco van Peijpe, Independent Contractors and Protected Workers in Dutch Law, 21
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 127, 141, 152 (1999); see also Buitengewoon Besluit
Arbeidsverhoudingen oktober 5 1945, Stb. 1945 (Neth.).
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a person, whether or not employed under a contract of
employment . . . who performs work or services for another
person for compensation or reward on such terms and
conditions that the dependent contractor is in a position of
economic dependence upon, and under an obligation to
perform duties for, that person more closely resembling the
relationship of an employee than that of an independent
contractor.214
The United States should follow suit and extend the reach of
employee-protection statutes that serve core societal goals to
economically dependent contractors.
2. Enhancing the Portability of Benefits
Employee benefits should be made more portable in nature. This
could be accomplished by linking benefits with workers and their careers
rather than with a particular employing entity.215
As an example, state unemployment compensation laws could be
altered to permit more employees who work in part-time and temporary
positions to qualify for some proportion of unemployment benefits.
Similarly, Congress could amend ERISA to provide that employees who
work for more than one employer may accumulate periods of service to
meet the minimum vesting periods for a pension plan. In both situations,
the cost of providing these benefits could be prorated among the various
employing entities. As one commentator has summarized, “the very logic
of organizing benefits [only] around employment is a flawed concept.”216
B. Union–Management Relations
1. Card-Check Certification
An important agenda item for labor law reform is the adoption of a
card-check certification process for determining representation status.
Such a step would retain the principle of majority rule, but in an
environment free from the intimidation and misinformation all too typical
of a contested election campaign.217 Under this system, which is used in
a number of Canadian provinces,218 and under the United Kingdom’s

214. Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. ch. 1, Sched. A., § 1(1) (Can.).
215. See BEFORT & BUDD, supra note 1, at 140–41.
216. JENNIFER KLEIN, FOR ALL THESE RIGHTS: BUSINESS, LABOR, AND THE SHAPING OF
AMERICA’S PUBLIC-PRIVATE WELFARE STATE 14 (Princeton Univ. Press 2003).
217. Befort, supra note 5, at 435.
218. Roy L. Heenan, Canada, in I INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS 21–26
to 21–27 (2d ed. 2003).
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Employment Relations Act of 1999,219 an employer would be obligated
to recognize and negotiate with a union that presents signed authorization
cards from a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit.220 Such a
proposal was embodied in the Employee Free Choice Act proposal that
passed the House of Representatives in 2007, but it did not make its way
through the Senate chambers.221
2. Curbing the Use of Replacement Employees
Labor law reform should also curtail the permissible use of
replacement workers by employers during strikes and lockouts.222
Legislation adopted in Ontario provides a possible model in the context
of strikes. The Ontario statute authorizes struck employers to hire
temporary, but not permanent, replacement workers for the first six
months of a lawful strike.223 Only if a strike continues beyond that point
may employers deny reinstatement to those strikers who have been
replaced.224 In terms of employer-instigated lockouts, an employer’s right
to hire replacement workers should be limited in time to something in the
range of three to six months.225
3. Enhanced Remedies
The remedies for unfair labor practices need to be enhanced to deter
illegal anti-union activities. At a minimum, the National Labor Relations
Board should be empowered to remedy discriminatory discharges in a
manner similar to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act by
including an award of liquidated damages in an amount up to the size of
the compensatory award.226
C. Employment Security
The United States should join the rest of the industrialized world and
enact a statute that broadly addresses the issue of employment security.227
This statute should adopt a unitary, just-cause standard for termination
that would be informed by existing statutes, but supplant them as
independent causes of action. This statute should also establish a
219. Nancy Peters, The United Kingdom Recalibrates the U.S. National Labor Relations Act:
Possible Lessons for the United States?, 25 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 227, 233–34 (2004).
220. Id.
221. Employee Free Choice Act of 2007, H.R. 800, 110th Cong. (2007).
222. See Befort, supra note 5, at 442.
223. Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. ch. 1, sched. A, § 80 (Can.).
224. Id.
225. See Ray & Cameron, supra note 63, at 360.
226. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2012).
227. See Befort, supra note 5, at 424–32.
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streamlined administrative structure for determining individual cases that
replaces the current multiplicity of claims and forums. Finally, this statute
should establish a reasonable cap on monetary damages that could be
doubled or tripled upon a finding that the lack of good cause for
termination was attributable to unlawful discrimination.228
D. Income Inequality
1. Increase the Minimum Wage
The federal Fair Labor Standards Act mandates a minimum wage for
covered employees of $7.25 per hour.229 In real dollar terms, the value of
the federally mandated minimum wage has fallen by more than 12% since
1967.230 As the movement for a $15 minimum wage has underscored,231
a substantial increase in the minimum wage would boost the earnings of
low-wage workers and it is overdue.232
2. Expand the Earned Income Tax Credit
A second tool for combating the growth in income inequality is to
expand the size and reach of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
program. The EITC was enacted in the 1970s with the slogan “make work
pay” and has been expanded several times since then.233 The EITC
provides a tax credit that reduces the income tax liability of low-income
workers and, in some instances, provides an actual wage supplement to
workers and their families. As one commentator has written, “the
cheapest, least bureaucratic method of raising working people above the
poverty line is to continue expanding the EITC.”234
3. Adopt a More Progressive Income Tax
A third device for reducing income inequality would be to revert to a
more progressively indexed rate of income taxation. Substantial tax cuts
enacted in the 1980s and 2000s disproportionately benefited high-income

228. See BEFORT & BUDD, supra note 1, at 165–69.
229. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1).
230. MISCHEL ET AL., supra note 117, at 279.
231. See generally Eric Morath et al., Push for $15 Minimum Wage Heats Up; As California
and New York Pursue Hike, Opponents and Proponents Debate the Economic Impact, WALL ST.
J. (Mar. 31, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/race-for-15-minimum-wage-heats-up-1459.html.
232. Rebecca M. Blank, Fighting Poverty: Lessons from Recent U.S. History, 14 J. ECON.
PERSP. 3, 14 (2000).
233. See BEFORT & BUDD, supra note 1, at 271.
234. KATHERINE S. NEWMAN, NO SHAME IN MY GAME: THE WORKING POOR IN THE INNER
CITY 271–73 (1999).
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taxpayers.235 A return to a more progressive income tax would transfer
some of the income of high-salary earners to social service programs
designed to boost the prospects of the working poor.236
E. Worker Time Crunch
1. Paid Leave for Caregivers
The United States should join other industrialized democracies and
require paid leave for employees with caregiver responsibilities. If
adopted as an amendment to the FMLA, employees could use this leave
to care for sick or disabled family members or for newborn or newly
adopted children. Possible sources of funding include unemployment
insurance, temporary disability insurance, or tax incentives.237 At this
point, five states already have adopted legislation mandating paid
caregiver leave.238
2. Right-to-Request Legislation
Germany and the Netherlands have enacted statutes that grant fulltime employees the right to request a reduced workload for any reason,
even one that is unrelated to caregiver responsibilities.239 The employer
must grant such a request unless legitimate business reasons preclude it,
and an employee may institute legal proceedings to challenge an
employer’s refusal.240 The United Kingdom has adopted a more limited
statute under which employees who are parents of children under age six
or of disabled children under age eighteen have the right to request a
flexible work schedule from their employers for the purpose of caring for
those children.241 While employers have a duty to discuss those requests,
the U.K. statute does not authorize a substantive review of the employer’s
235. See BEFORT & BUDD, supra note 1, at 155.
236. Id.
237. See Lester, supra note 150, at 16; Anne Wells, Paid Family Leave: Striking a Balance
Between the Needs of Employees and Employers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1067, 1075 (2004).
238. NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN AND FAMILIES, STATE PAID FAMILY LEAVE INSURANCE LAWS
1 (2017), http://www.nationalpartnership.org/research-library/work-family/paid-leave/statepaid-family-leave-laws.pdf.
239. ARIANE HEGEWISCH, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POLICY RESEARCH, FLEXIBLE WORKING
POLICIES:
A
COMPARATIVE
REVIEW
vi
(2009),
http://www.equalityne.co.uk/downloads/426_Flexible-Working-Policies.pdf.
240. Susanne D. Burri et al., Work-Family Policies on Working Time Put into Practice: A
Comparison of Dutch and German Case Law on Working Time Adjustment, 19 INT’L J. COMP.
LAB. L. & INDUS. REL. 321, 328 (2003).
241. DEP’T OF TRADE AND INDUS., FLEXIBLE WORKING: THE RIGHT TO REQUEST AND THE
DUTY TO CONSIDER 2 (2003), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/www.dti.gov.uk/
files/file21364.pdf.
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business judgment.242 The United States should consider the adoption of
a “right to request” statute that protects the right of employees with
caregiver obligations with respect to any child under the age of eighteen
or to any parent over the age of sixty-five to seek modified work
schedules.243
F. Retirement Security
1. Saving Social Security
Congress needs to take action to make the Social Security system
solvent. As I have written elsewhere, this could be accomplished through
a combination of three relatively modest benefit and tax adjustments: (1)
increasing the full-retirement age to sixty-seven and indexing additional
adjustments to future changes in life expectancy; (2) returning the
maximum taxable earnings base for the Social Security payroll tax to a
figure equivalent to 90% of national income from work-related earnings;
and (3) indexing benefit levels based on an individual worker’s after-tax
wage earning history.244
2. Encouraging Personal Saving
U.S. law currently encourages personal savings through a variety of
tax preferences. But these preferences primarily benefit high-income
earners. Sound policy reform should focus on providing additional
incentives to low- and middle-income workers. One potential path would
be to enhance the reach of the Saver’s Credit.245 The Saver’s Credit
provides a matching contribution in the form of a tax credit for voluntary
individual contributions to 401(k) plans, IRAs, and similar retirement
savings arrangements.246 The legislation adopts a progressive structure
with the rate of government subsidy falling as household income rises.247
The Saver’s Credit, however, currently only confers a benefit on
taxpayers who have a federal income tax liability against which to apply
the credit.248 The benefits of the Saver’s Credit should be expanded in
242. Employment Act, 2002, ch. 22, pt. 4, §§ 47(2)(80G)–(H), 47(3)(47E)(1); The Flexible
Working (Procedural Requirements) Regulations 2002, SI 2002 No. 3207(6).
243. See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Incenting Flexibility: The Relationship Between Public
Law and Voluntary Action in Enhancing Work/Life Balance, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1081, 1108 (2010).
244. Befort, supra note 171, at 966–70.
245. Id. at 984–85.
246. IRS, Retirement Savings Contributions Credit (Saver’s Credit), https://www.irs.gov/
retirement-plans/plan-participant-employee/retirement-savings-contributions-savers-credit (last
visited June 2, 2017).
247. See 26 U.S.C. § 25B (2012).
248. See J. Mark Iwry et al., The Saver’s Credit: Expanding Retirement Savings for Middleand Lower-Income Americans, BROOKINGS (Mar. 1, 2005), https://www.brookings.edu/research/
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two ways. First, the government should substitute a monetary payment in
lieu of an income tax credit for individuals who make a matching
contribution to a qualifying pension or savings program, but who do not
have a sufficient tax liability to make use of the tax credit.249 Second,
Congress should mandate employers with more than ten employees and
no pension coverage to establish “automatic IRAs” funded by
withholding 3% of an employee’s salary.250
CONCLUSION
This Article chronicles a continuing decline in the fortunes of
American workers. U.S. workers are working more hours, but receiving
a diminished share of overall income. They are experiencing a decline in
both job quality and job security. Unions continue to evaporate and lose
clout. Retirement security is increasingly precarious.
The imbalance in power between workers and employers is
unacceptable by several measures. The current disequilibrium does not
serve the basic equity objective of producing fair workplace relationships
and outcomes. It diminishes employee voice in basic workplace decisionmaking. And the disparity between the haves and the have-nots threatens
long-term social stability.
Legal and policy reforms are needed if we hope to recalibrate the
current imbalance and move toward a climate of shared prosperity. The
agenda for reform set out in this Article may seem unobtainable given the
current political stalemate, but at some point, circumstances may coalesce
to make meaningful change preferable to a continuance of the downward
spiral.
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